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1. Introduction 
 
In daily life we not only speak not only of knowing facts but also of know-how.  We may 
not only judge that someone knows that the stock market is in decline, that an avalanche 
is imminent or that ice is not marble but also that someone knows how to make money on 
the stock exchange, knows how to survive an avalanche or knows how to carve a realistic 
life-sized human figure from a block of marble.  Ryle (1949, 26-60) first drew attention 
to analysis of know-how and argued that know-how does not consist of propositional 
knowledge.  He went on to give an analysis of know-how.  Since then the analysis of 
propositional knowledge has largely overshadowed that of know-how.  However there 
has been a resurgence of interest in it.  For example, relatively recent proposals in 
philosophy of mind and ethics proceed in terms of know-how1.  For example, in response 
to Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, David Lewis replies that knowing what an 
experience is like is a matter of knowing how to recognise, remember and imagine it2.  
Hilary Putnam claims (1996, xvi) that “knowing the meaning of the word ‘gold’ or of the 
word ‘elm’ is not a matter of knowing that at all, but a matter of knowing how”.  A more 
specific variant on this claim is Michael Devitt’s (1966, 173) conclusion that someone 
who knows the meaning of a term knows how to use it with a certain meaning but that 
such a person need not have ‘any propositional knowledge about what constitutes its 
meaning’. 
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 In the light of these proposals it seems worth seeing what can be said about the 
relationship of know-how to propositional knowledge.  In particular it seems worth 
examining the claim that someone’s know-how consists of his knowledge of a body of 
facts.  For if it turns out that this claim is true, then any satisfactory account of 
propositional knowledge will also account for know-how.  On the other hand if that claim 
turns out to be false then a satisfactory account of know-how would be useful not only in 
its own right but also as way of deepening the proposals that appeal to know-how.  A 
promising but self-admittedly incomplete account is given by Katherine Hawley (2003). 
The account holds that know-how is ‘successful action plus warrant’ (2003, 19), where 
success is to be understood counterfactually and ‘warrant’ is stipulated as whatever extra 
is needed to turn it into know-how.  
In §2 I argue that such as all know-how requires a specific form of propositional 
knowledge, so all propositional knowledge requires a specific form of know-how. 
I then turn to the more important claim that know-how always consists of a body of 
propositional knowledge.  In  §3 I examine Ryle’s five arguments against this claim, the 
first four of which are from lack of grounds, from inability of consideration, from partial 
knowledge and from time of learning. I show that none of these arguments are sound.    
Ryle’s most influential argument is an argument from regress.  This can also be shown to 
be unsound, partly for reasons given by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001, 
412-416).  In §4 I examine their argument that know-how is simply a species of 
propositional knowledge and show that it fails.  What is needed then is an analysis of 
know-how that is neutral on whether it consists of a body of propositional knowledge.  In 
§5 I show that Ryle’s own analysis is unsatisfactory in both holding incorrectly that 
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know-how is actual ability and in making it impossible to know that anyone else has 
know-how.  In §6 I note central features of how-how that any analysis must respect.  
These include the facts, noted by Hawley, that someone may know how to perform a task 
that he has never performed (2003, 20-21) or is occasionally unable to perform (2003, 24) 
or is newly unable to ever again perform (2003 22-23).  Other important features of 
know-how are its egocentricity and opacity. In §7 I argue that when we ask if someone 
knows how to succeed in performing a task, the circumstances we use in contextually 
specifying that task must be identical to those by which we measure success in 
performing it.  In §8 I follow Hawley (2003, 25) in proposing that although knowing how 
to V does not require actual success in V-ing, it does require counterfactual success in the 
sense that 
If S knows how to V-in-circumstances-C then if S were to try to V in 
circumstances C then S would succeed in V-ing.  
 
This proposal explains all of the central features of know-how except certain cases of 
opacity.  In §9 I examine Hawley’s three analogues of Gettier examples that are supposed 
to show that counterfactual success is not sufficient for know-how and show that only 
two of these examples demonstrate this.  Hawley is neutral on the question of what else is 
needed to define know-how.  I propose blocking her two examples by the definition that  
S knows how to V-in-circumstances-C just in case if S were to try to V in C then 
S would succeed because S would use a reliable method of V-ing in C. 
 
This provides a fuller explanation of the opacity of know-how.  I conclude in §10 by 
replying to an objection to the claim that there is no know-how without method. 
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 2.  Necessary connections between propositional knowledge and know-how  
 
Surely a person could not know how to carve a realistic human figure from a block of 
marble unless he knew that carving marble is not crushing marble or that carving marble 
is not carving ice.  This point seems to hold for all cases of know-how: Where ‘V’ and 
‘W’ denote verbs, for all tasks, V-ing, there is a task W-ing, such that   
If S knows how to V then S knows that V-ing is not W-ing 
For example, one could not know how to ride a bicycle unless one knew that riding a 
bicycle is not repairing a bicycle or riding a horse. 
 It may be argued that a reverse connection also holds – that any propositional 
knowledge requires a form of know-how.  One principle that is plausible is that belief 
requires the ability of thought: 
 If S believes that p then S has the ability to consider the proposition that p. 
Your question, ‘Do eels eat glass?’ may make me newly conscious of my long-held belief 
that they don’t, but although I have never had thoughts of glass-eating eels before, I have 
long had the ability to have them. This requirement explains why although we may 
intuitively suppose that a dog has rudimentary beliefs about the food in its bowl (which 
helps us explain its behaviour as it strains at its leash); we hesitate to attribute to it the 
belief that it will be beaten in Lent. Clearly it does not have the concept of Lent and so 
lacks the ability to think thoughts of Lent. The requirement also explains our difficulty in 
characterising the beliefs of other species in any fine-grained way, since it is difficult to 
specify, using the linguistic expressions of our thoughts, exactly what concepts, or 
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derivatively, thoughts, are available to those with radically different linguistic capacities 
and ways of behaving.   
Admittedly, the requirement is challenged by the fact that in one sense I can 
believe things on authority that I do not understand. For example, I may believe an 
authority on physics that assures me that entropy is increasing although I have no idea 
what entropy is. But believing that she has said something true is different from believing 
what she says. While I don’t believe that entropy is increasing, I do believe that she has 
said something true, although I don’t know what this truth is. For although I cannot think 
thoughts of entropy, I can think the thought that by using the word ‘entropy’, she has said 
something true.  Similarly, when presented with the inscription, 
1 + 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1+ 1 + 1 is greater than 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1  
 
I can sincerely and truly assert ‘That’s true’ without having the thought that 10 is greater 
than 7.  What I correctly believe is that the inscription says something true, in virtue of 
correctly believing that the number denoted by the left-hand side is greater than that 
denoted by the right-hand side. 
A different sort of apparent counterexample arises when I seem to have only a  
partial grasp of the content of my belief. For example, mistakenly thinking that arthritis is 
an inflammation of bones as well as joints, I sincerely utter to you ‘Arthritis has spread to 
my thigh’. Intuitively we feel that I mistakenly believe something to do with arthritis. The 
correctness of this intuition seems to rule out the required ability of thought.  For since 
my inability to reliably distinguish cases of arthritis from other aliments precludes my 
grasp of the concept of arthritis embedded in would-be thoughts of arthritis, it follows 
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that I can’t think any thoughts of arthritis.  Thus I don’t hold the belief, mistaken or 
otherwise, that arthritis has spread to my thigh.   
But surely I do mistakenly believe that inflammation of the joints and bones has 
spread to my thigh.  Moreover I mistakenly believe that what you call ‘arthritis’ has 
spread to my thigh.  Since both inflammation of the joints and bones and what you call 
‘arthritis’ have something to do with arthritis, the correctness of the intuition that I 
mistakenly believe something to do with arthritis is consistent with the required ability of 
thought after all. 
A second principle that is now generally accepted is the doxacity of propositional 
knowledge: 
 If S knows that p then believes that p 
What follows from these two principles is a third, that propositional knowledge requires 
the ability of thought: 
 If S knows that p then S has the ability to think the thought that p 
So, for example, if I know that felines are vertebrates then I have the ability to think the 
thought that felines are vertebrates.  But I could hardly have this ability unless I have the 
concepts embedded in that would-be thought, in this case the concepts of felines and of 
vertebrates.  Moreover my possession of a concept involves at least my knowing how to 
distinguish cases that are instances of that concept from cases that are not.  I could hardly 
know what counts as a feline if I did not know how to tell cat from an insect.  So  
If S knows that p then knows how to distinguish cases that are instances of the 
concepts embedded in the thought that p from cases that are not. 
 
However, the most important question is the truth of the claim that  
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All cases in which S knows how to V consist of S’s body of propositional 
knowledge.    
 
At first sight, this seems correct for relatively simple tasks. It is initially plausible to say 
that knowing how to dial 999 is just knowing that the way to dial 999 is to pick up the 
receiver and dial 9 three times. By contrast the claim looks much less plausible for tasks 
that demand skill and experience.  Could someone who has never so much as picked up a 
chisel really learn how to carve a realistic life-sized human figure from a block of marble 
by learning all the relevant facts about that task?  However a defender of the claim might 
consistently insist that some of these crucial facts could only learned by experience at 
performing, or trying to perform, this task.  It might also be insisted that the body of 
known facts that make up knowing how to carve a realistic human figure from a block of 
marble would not only include facts about marble and human anatomy but would also 
include relevant demonstrative facts such as the fact that marble shears like this when it is 
tapped gently like so with a chisel shaped like that.   
 
3.  Ryle’s five arguments that know-how does not consist of propositional knowledge  
 
Ryle has five arguments that know-how does not consist of propositional knowledge, 
namely from lack of grounds, from inability of consideration, from partial knowledge, 
from time of learning and from regress.  The last of these has been by far the most 
influential. Ryle’s argument (1949, 29) from lack of grounds consists in his observation 
that  
… though it is proper to ask for the grounds or reasons for someone’s acceptance of a proposition, 
this question cannot be asked of someone’s skill at cards or prudence in investments.  
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In other words 
Whenever S knows that p then S has grounds for believing that p 
S never has grounds for knowing how to V 
____________________________________________________ 
S’s knowing how to V does not consist of S’s knowledge of facts   
 
The truth of the second premise is a consequence of the fact that since it makes no sense 
to speak of ‘believing how to V’, there is no such thing as ‘grounded believing how to V’ 
either.  But the argument is invalid.  An opponent may simply acknowledge the truth of 
the premises but consistently claim that S’s knowing how to V consists in S’s knowing 
facts about how to V, in other words, consists in S’s grounded beliefs of a kind special 
enough to be propositional knowledge.  For example, consider someone who claims that 
Alan’s knowing how to dial 999 consists in Alan’s knowing that the way to dial 999 is to 
dial three times in a row.  That person may claim that Alan’s know-how consists of 
Alan’s grounded belief of a special kind, that the way to dial 999 is to dial 9 three times 
in a row.  Described one way, as plain know-how, it is not appropriate to speak of 
grounds.  But described another, as knowledge of facts about the task at hand, it is 
appropriate.  S’s grounds attach to his knowing how to V, but only in the sense that they 
essentially attach to the beliefs that are in turn an essential part of his body of knowledge 
of facts about how to V, one that constitutes his know-how.  Looked at this way, Ryle’s 
opponent may deny that what is true of the constituents of know-how is true of know-
how itself. Alternatively, he may insist that once know-how is correctly analysed in terms 
of constituent knowledge of facts, it is appropriate to speak of grounded beliefs after all. 
Ryle advances his argument from inability of reflection (1949, 31) as follows 
It was because Aristotle found himself and others reasoning now intelligently and now stupidly 
and it was because Izaak Walton found himself and others angling sometimes effectively and 
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sometimes ineffectively that both were able to give their pupils maxims and prescriptions of their 
arts.  It is therefore possible for people intelligently to perform some sorts of operations when they 
are not yet able to consider any propositions enjoining how they should be performed. 
This argument has the form 
In some cases in which S knows how to V, S does not have the ability to consider 
any proposition about how to V 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 In these cases, S knows how to V but does not know any fact about how to V 
 
Given the principle that knowledge requires the ability of thought, this argument  
is valid.  But there is no reason to think that its premise is true.  Certainly Ryle’s two 
examples lend it no support.  For in the sense of ‘ability’ in which knowledge requires the 
ability of thought, it is surely an exaggeration to say that Aristotle or Walton lacked that 
ability.  Had Walton been presented with the claim that 
 Worms are good bait for trout 
he could certainly have considered it.  He had the ability to consider it even if in fact he 
 
never did.  In a case in which I have no idea what entropy is, I cannot know any fact 
about entropy, as opposed to knowing facts about the word ‘entropy’.  But in such a case, 
the right thing to say seems to be that I cannot know how to perform tasks related to 
entropy either.  In such cases I do not know how to prove that entropy is increasing or 
know how to explain what entropy is.  In §8 my analysis of know-how will explain why  
this is the correct result.  In short, Ryle’s second argument is unsound. 
Ryle advances his argument from partial knowledge (1949, 57-58) as follows 
 We never speak of a person having partial knowledge of a fact or truth, save in the special sense 
of his having knowledge of a part of a body of facts or truths.  A boy can be said to have partial 
knowledge of the counties of England, if he knows some of them and does not know others.  But 
he could not be said to have incomplete knowledge of Sussex being and English county.  Either he 
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knows this fact or he does not know it.  On the other hand, it is proper and normal to speak of a 
person knowing in part how to do something, i.e. of his having a particular capacity in a limited 
degree.  An ordinary chess-player knows the game pretty well but a champion knows it better and 
even the champion has much to learn. 
This third argument has the form 
There are cases in which S partially knows how to V 
 There can be no case in which S partially knows that p 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
S’s knowing how to V does not consist of S’s knowledge of facts about how to V   
 
This argument is faulty is two ways.  Firstly, it is invalid.  A defender of the reduction 
may consistently concede the truth of the premises yet reply that full knowledge of how 
to V requires knowledge of each of a set of facts and that the knowledge of only majority 
of these results in partial knowledge of how to V.  Secondly, once we contextualise the 
task in question by specifying success in performing it relative to precise standards, there 
seems to be no room for only partially knowing how to perform it.  If we take success in 
playing chess as a matter of knowing how to make legal moves then either a person 
knows how to play-chess-by-making-legal-moves or he does not.  Likewise, once the 
standards of successful championship chess are sharpened, say in terms of a rating 
calculated on the basis of past wins versus losses, then there is no matter of degree about 
whether someone knows how to play to that standard.   
Ryle’s argument from time of learning (1949, 58) is that 
It makes sense to ask at what moment someone became apprised of truth, but not to ask at what 
moment someone acquired a skill. 
This argument has the form 
 There is a definite time at which S learns that p  
 There is no definite time at which S learns how to V 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
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S’s knowing how to V does not consist of S’s knowledge of facts about how to V   
 
The fault in this argument is that the truth of its second premise is dubious.  Consider a 
small boy who is learning to ride a bicycle without falling off. The boy falls off at the 
first nine attempts.  But the tenth time that he tries to ride the bicycle he succeeds in 
staying on.  Moreover he nearly always stays on at subsequent attempts.  It seems quite 
principled to say that he first learned to ride a bicycle without falling off at his tenth 
attempt to do so.   
 But the argument Ryle considered crucial against the reduction (1949, 31) is his 
argument from regress: 
The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less 
intelligent, less or more stupid.  But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior 
theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical 
impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. 
The argument is a reductio.  It tries to show that the supposition that knowing how to V is 
just a matter of knowing that p, entails an impossible infinity of mental acts.  It relies on 
two premises  
If S V’s then S knows how to V 
and 
If S knows that p then S considers the proposition that p 
Now suppose that 
S’s knowing how to V consists in S’s knowledge that p 
and that 
S knows how to V.   
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These two suppositions entail that S knows that p.  From the second premise it follows 
that S considers the proposition that p, so by the first premise, S knows how to consider 
the proposition that p.  But on the reductive supposition, this consists in S’s knowledge 
that q, so by the second premise again, S knows how to consider the proposition that q.  
By the first premise again, S knows how to consider the proposition that q.  But on the 
reductive supposition, this consists in S’s knowledge that r … and so ad infinitum.  The 
proposition that q, is about considering the proposition that p, just as the proposition that 
r is about considering the proposition that q.  So S must consider each of an infinite series 
of propositions, each of which is more complex than the one before.  Since this is 
impossible, S cannot know how to V.  But this is false, so S’s knowing how to V cannot 
consist in his knowing facts about how to V.    
 To illustrate this, suppose that Ben knows how to dial 999.  Suppose that this is 
just a matter of Ben knowing relevant facts about dialling 999.  For example suppose that 
Ben’s knowing how to dial 999 is just Ben’s knowing that  
To dial 999, one must pick up the receiver and dial 9 three times.   
In that case Ben must first consider this proposition. But this means that Ben must know 
how to consider this proposition, which means that he knows the truth of a second, more 
complex proposition that describes the way in which the first is to be considered.  What 
follows is the absurd conclusion that Ben must perform each of an infinite series of prior 
acts of consideration, each of which is ever-increasingly complex. 
 Stanley and Williamson point out that this argument is unsound.  Against the  
premise, 
If S V’s then S knows how to V 
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they observe that while it may be true that 
 Hannah digests food 
it is false to say that 
Hannah knows how to digest food. 
Digesting food is just not the sort of thing one can know how to do. Against the second 
premise, I might know a fact yet be unaware that I know it, in which case I need not 
consider the content of what I know.  For example, my picking up the telephone receiver 
manifests my knowledge that the receiver was on the hook.  But as I pick it up, the 
question of whether the receiver was on the hook need never occur to me, let alone the 
question of whether I know this.  Moreover it is surely absurd to suppose that a dreamless 
sleep plunges me into a state of total ignorance.  While dreamlessly asleep I continue to 
know many facts yet do not consider anything at all.  Ryle could side-step the example of 
Hannah by modifying his first premise to  
If S intentionally V’s then S knows how to V 
But this move would fail for two reasons. Firstly, as Stanley and Williamson show, then 
his second premise would also have to be modified to read 
  If S knows that p then S intentionally considers the proposition that p. 
This modification would have a point if we allow that there are cases in which one may 
consider a proposition without being conscious that one is doing so. But then it is clearly 
false, as the examples above show.  I knew that the receiver was on the hook as I went to 
pick it up, but I did not intend to reflect upon it.  Not did I intend to consider anything 
while dreamlessly asleep. The second problem with the modified claim that 
If S intentionally V’s then S knows how to V 
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is that it is falsified by certain analogues of Gettier cases.  Just as Gettier cases show that 
a justified but luckily true belief that p need not be knowledge that p, so analogues of 
these cases show that lucky success in V-ing need not constitute knowing how to V.  
Consider an example given by Hawley (2003, 27).  Shelley has a method of making a 
cake.  This is to take whatever ingredients are closest to hand, mix them and bake the 
resulting mixture.  By lucky chance, the ingredients closest to hand are those that when 
mixed and baked, result in a cake. Had the ingredients been red wine, cheese and pickled 
onions instead of milk, butter, eggs and flour, then she would not have baked a cake.  
Surely Shelley does not know how to make a cake, despite the fact that she has 
accidentally made one.  This point remains if we now suppose that Shelley was trying to 
make a cake by means of her method instead of just experimenting with the first 
ingredients to hand.  Shelley has intentionally made a cake but she did not know how to 
do so. 
 None of Ryle’s arguments succeed in showing that know-how does not consist of 
knowledge of facts.  Let us now consider an argument that it does.  
 
4. Stanley and Williamson’s argument that know-how consists of propositional 
    knowledge 
 
Stanley and Williamson (2001, 411) argue that ‘knowledge-how is simply a species of 
knowledge-that’.  According to them, the ‘standardly accepted constituent structure’ 
(2001, 419) of  
 Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle 
is 
 14
 Hannah knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle] 
where ‘PRO’ is ‘a phonologically null pronoun that occurs, according to standard 
syntactic theory, in the subject position of untensed clauses’ (2001, 419).  One instance of 
‘PRO’ is ‘Bill’.  Another is ‘she herself’.  Stanley and Williamson observe that  
 Hannah knows how Bill rides a bicycle 
‘seems clearly to attribute propositional knowledge to Hannah’ (2001, 419).  They then 
claim that ‘from the perspective of syntactic theory, there is no difference’ (2001, 419) 
between this and 
 Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
They conclude that this latter also ascribes propositional knowledge to Hannah.   They go 
on to claim that this ascription is of the form  
 Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
We might concede that  
 Hannah knows how Bill rides a bicycle 
and 
 Hannah knows how she herself rides a bicycle 
ascribe two different pieces of propositional knowledge to Hannah.  But there is no 
reason to think that the latter is equivalent to a proposition of the form 
 Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
For if Hannah knows how she herself rides a bicycle then she must ride a bicycle on at 
least one occasion.  But Hannah may know that doing so-and-so is a way for her to ride a 
bicycle even if she never rides one.  Nor is a proposition of the form    
 S knows that w is a way for him to V 
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equivalent to  
S know how to V. 
To see this, let us revisit the example of Ben faced with the simpler task of dialling 999.  
Suppose that Ben knows that the only way of dialling 999 is to pick up the receiver and 
dial 9 three times.  In that case it would be true that   
Ben knows that picking up the receiver and dialling 9 three times is a way 
for him to dial 999. 
 
But now suppose that on the many occasions on which Ben tries to pick up the receiver 
and dial 9 three times, he invariably fails to do so.  Perhaps trying to pick up a telephone 
receiver invariably causes him to panic, with the result that he cannot grasp it.  Or 
perhaps he invariably confuses the numeral ‘9’ with the numeral ‘7’.  Surely in such a 
case it is false that  
 Ben knows how to dial 999.   
This point may be generalised. S’s theoretical knowledge of the way to V successfully is 
always consistent with the fact that S would fail to V if he tried.  So such theoretical 
knowledge cannot secure S’s practical know-how in V-ing.  This explains why the 
analysis seems implausible for cases in which know-how is exercised spontaneously.  
Surely a comedian might know how to make his audience laugh without knowing the 
truth of any proposition of the form 
 w is a way to make the audience laugh.   
Secondly, let us turn Stanley and Williamson’s equation around. Hannah surely knows 
that  
Swallowing food is a way for her to digest food. 
In fact she probably knows that swallowing it is the only way for her to digest it.  But as 
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Stanley and Williamson themselves observe, she does not know how to digest food.   
We have yet to find any convincing argument for or against the claim that S’s 
knowing how to V consists in S knowing facts.  What is needed then is an analysis of 
know-how that leaves this question open.  I argue for such an analysis in §8 and §9.  
Before doing so, it is worth pausing to consider Ryle’s own analysis. 
 
5.  Ryle’s analysis of know-how 
 
Ryle holds that S’s knowing how to V is just S’s ability to V.  S’s ability to V is in turn a 
complex of dispositions (1949, 33).  S’s dispositions are for S ‘to be bound or liable to be 
in a particular state, or undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is 
realized’ (1949, 43).  Moreover these dispositions are ‘multiple-track’ meaning that their 
actualizations are ‘indefinitely heterogeneous’ or in other words ‘can take a wide and 
perhaps unlimited variety of shapes’ (1949, 43).  In other words, such dispositions are 
expressible as a conjunction of counterfactual conditionals each of which describes how 
S would definitely or probably behave under specified circumstances.  Since these 
circumstances may be specified in any number of ways, both the exact number and 
identity of conjuncts is indeterminate.  
 Ryle’s account suffers from two main defects. Lewis (1990, 516) follows Ryle in 
claiming that that ‘know how is ability’.  But knowing how to V neither entails nor is 
entailed by the actual ability to V.  Against the first entailment, we may still know how to 
perform a task we are newly ever again to perform. Just as falling into a dreamless sleep 
does not plunge one into total ignorance, so the loss of a leg does not suddenly expunge 
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knowing how to ride a bike (Hawley 2003, 22-23).   Suppose that Cedric, the seasoned 
Singapore-to-Thailand cyclist, suddenly loses a leg.  The loss of his leg does not cause 
Cedric to forget anything and he may still retain the ability to reach others how to cycle 
long distances.  If Cedric is otherwise just as healthy and determined as before, we would 
say that Cedric still knows how to cycle from Singapore to Thailand although he is no 
longer able to do so.   
Nor does the ability to V entail knowing how to V.  The fact that Hannah digests 
food shows that she has the physical ability to do so.  For if she were unable to digest it 
then she wouldn’t be digesting it.  But Hannah does not know how to digest food.  
Likewise although the fact that Shelley has made a cake does not show that she has the 
ability to consistently succeed in making cakes, it does show that she had the ability to 
make one on at least one occasion.  Had she been unable to make a cake then she would 
not have made one.  But Shelley does not know how to make a cake.  She was able to 
make a cake, but only by accident. 
 The second defect in Ryle’s analysis is its specific vagueness.  It is a virtue of any 
account of know-how that it will allow cases in which it is impossible to decide whether 
someone knows how to V.  But Ryle’s analysis is vague in a different way.  It makes the 
meaning of any ascription of know-how vague.  On Ryle’s account, it is impossible to 
know exactly which counterfactual conditionals conjointly constitute S’s knowing how to 
V.  So the full meaning of any ascription of know-how is unknowable.  This is hardly a 
virtue of a semantic analysis.  A dire consequence of this is that it makes it impossible to 
know that anyone else has know-how.  To know that a conjunction is true is to know that 
each of its conjuncts is true. But on Ryle’s account, one can never be sure that each of the 
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counterfactual conditionals that conjointly constitute the truth of an ascription of know-
how is true, for the simple reason that one can never be in a position to know exactly 
which are included.  This consequence is absurd.  Surely we do know that Gary Kasparov 
knows how to play chess.  Nor would it help Ryle to insist that an ascription of know-
how constitutes a disjunction of such counterfactual conditionals.  To know that a 
disjunction is false is to know that each of its disjuncts is false, so now the impossibility 
becomes that of knowing that anyone else does not have know-how.  This is equally 
absurd.  Surely we also know that William Hung does not know how to sing. 
 So far we have seen that an analysis of know-how is worth pursuing but that the 
pursuit does not lie in Ryle’s direction.  Before giving such an analysis, it is worth noting 
some central features of know-how that any satisfactory analysis should respect.  
    
6. Central features of know-how 
 
We may know how to perform tasks we have never performed (Hawley, 2003, 20-21).  
Most of us have never had to dial 999 but most of us know how to dial it.  Secondly, as 
we noted above, we may even know how to perform a task we are newly unable to ever 
again perform. Thirdly, we often allow someone an occasional inability to perform a task 
while still saying that he knows how to perform it (Hawley, 2003, 24).  Edward, who is 
the local expert at darts, may know how to hit the triple twenty even if he misses on 
occasion.  Or we might properly judge that Edward knows how to hit the triple twenty 
even when exceptional circumstances such as the loss of his spectacles or the 
consumption of six pints of Old Peculiar render him incapable of even hitting the board.  
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Two other features of know-how mirror those of propositional knowledge. 
Consider egocentricity.  Suppose that I am so drunk that I mistakenly believe that I am 
looking out of a window when really I am looking into a mirror.  I am necessarily the 
person who is my reflection. But just as I might know that the person in the glass has a 
cut on his head without knowing that I have a cut on my head, so I might know how to 
scratch my own nose while not knowing how to scratch the nose of the person I see in the 
glass. 
Now take opacity. Superman is necessarily Clark, so locating either of them is 
necessarily locating the other.  But just as Lois may know that Superman has special 
powers without knowing that Clark has them, so she may know how to contact Clark 
without knowing how to contact Superman4.   
Or consider a different example.  Suppose that Donald, who is not very bright, has 
been trained by the foreman of a factory to select three pieces of wood, check that they 
are the same length with a ruler and then glue them together to make a triangle.  Donald 
has had a bit of trouble in learning to use the ruler, but now he has got the hang of it.  
Every morning for the past month Donald has turned up for work and every morning his 
foreman has instructed him, ‘Don, make equilateral triangles today!’  He has happily 
complied.  It looks as if Donald knows how to make equilateral triangles out of wood.  
Perhaps he even knows how to make them out of plastic.  But then the next morning 
Donald turns up for work and his foreman instructs him, ‘Don, make equiangular 
triangles today!  Alas the protractor, or indeed anything to do with angles, is beyond 
Donald’s ken. He gapes in bewilderment.  It looks as if Donald knows how to make 
equilateral triangles out of wood or even plastic without having a clue how to make any 
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equiangular triangle out of anything.  And this is so despite the fact that since equilateral 
triangles are necessarily identical with equiangular ones, making either is necessarily 
making the other.     
  
7. Putting tasks in context 
 
To say that S knows how to V is to say that S knows how to successfully perform the task 
of V-ing.  For example, to say that someone knows how to play chess is to say that he 
knows how to successfully perform the task of playing chess.  But when we speak in this 
way, we always have a standard of success in mind, according to what conversational 
interests are at work.  If we are thinking of someone who is learning the game we might 
count success as knowing how to make legal moves on the board.  If we are talking about 
a more advanced player we might count it as include knowing how to employ tactics such 
as pins, forks and skewers.  At club level we might count success in chess playing as a 
minimum rating of past wins against losses.  So the same skills may be described as 
know-how in one context and not in another.  Likewise if are talking of a child learning 
to master a bicycle we might count knowing how to ride one as knowing how to travel 
short distances on it without falling off, but would set different standards of success for a 
competitor in the Tour de France.  Moreover, a person might know how to perform a task 
under some circumstances but not others.  Cedric might know how to ride a mountain 
bike downhill over logs yet not know how to ride the same bike along a firm sandy 
beach.   
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It is true that we sometimes have a default task in mind.  For example, when we 
ask if Cedric still knows how to ride a bicycle, we have in mind the task of cycling long 
distances on his road bike with the use of both legs. But this default assumption may be 
overridden, as when we admit that a chess player has a master’s rating but then wonder 
whether knows how to play chess blindfolded.  Moreover, although some tasks are more 
difficult than others, some sets of tasks have no paradigm cases.  Playing chess to 
championship standard is a more difficult task than making legal moves. Riding a bicycle 
with one leg is a more difficult task than riding it with two legs.  But riding a mountain 
bike downhill over logs is neither more nor less difficult than riding a road bike down a 
firm sandy beach.  Although both may be described as riding a bicycle, they are different 
tasks.  In the light of this it is best not to ask whether S knows how to V but to ask 
whether S knows how to V-in-circumstances-C.  In other words, when we ask if someone 
knows how to succeed in performing a task, the circumstances we use in contextually 
specifying that task must be identical to those by which we measure success in 
performing it.    
 
8. Counterfactual success and trying  
 
As Hawley points out (2003, 22) although knowing how to V does not require actual 
success in V-ing, it does require counterfactual success in the sense that 
If S knows how to V-in-circumstances-C then if S were to try to V in 
circumstances C then S would succeed in V-ing.  
 
The fact that someone may know how to do something they have never done is now 
easily explained as the fact that the conditional  
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 If S were to try to V in circumstances C then S would succeed in V-ing 
may be true despite the falsehood of its antecedent.  It might be true that if I were to try to 
dial 999 then I would succeed, despite the fact that I have never tried, nor will ever try, to 
do so.  In other words, the possible worlds closest to the actual world in which I try to 
dial 999 are worlds in which I succeed in dialling 999, despite the fact that at no time in 
the actual world do I try to dial 999.   
How does this handle the fact that Edward knows how to hit the triple twenty 
despite occasionally missing?  Again we need a more precise specification of the task we 
have in mind3.   We would not say that he knows how to hit the triple twenty all of the 
time.  For if he tried to do so then he would not succeed.  Even the most skilful player 
will miss eventually. Depending upon our conversational interests, we have in mind some 
period or other over which Edward hits the triple twenty most or, more modestly, some, 
of the time.  It may be true that he knows how to hit the triple twenty most of the time.  
Then it will be true that if Edward were to try to hit the triple twenty most of the time 
then he would succeed.  In other words, all of the possible worlds most similar to the 
actual world in which Edward tries to hit the triple twenty more often than not over a 
certain period are worlds in which he succeeds in doing so.  
 This account also explains why exceptional circumstances that rob Edward of his 
ability to hit the triple twenty even once need not expunge his knowing how to do so.  
When we say that Edward knows how to hit the triple twenty we are thinking of ordinary, 
default circumstances.  It may be still be true that 
If Edward were to try to hit the triple twenty more often than not, then he would 
normally succeed 
 
despite the fact that it is false that 
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If Edward were to try to hit the triple twenty more often than not-without-his- 
spectacles-and-after-six-pints-of-Old-Peculiar, then he would normally succeed. 
 
 Much the same move explains why Cedric may still know how to cycle from Singapore 
to Thailand after the loss of his leg has rendered him unable to do so.  When we judge 
that Cedric is unable to do so, we are thinking of present circumstances in which Cedric 
tries to cycle with only one leg.  But when we judge that Cedric still retains his know-
how, we are thinking of circumstances in which Cedric tries to cycle with both legs 
(Hawley, 2003 23).   It may still be true after the loss of his leg that    
If Cedric were to try to cycle from Singapore to Thailand-with-two-legs then he 
would normally succeed. 
 
Moreover we may be inductively justified in thinking that this is true if we know Cedric 
has often cycled from Singapore to Thailand and that the loss of his leg has only had a 
minimally adverse effect upon other qualities that are relevant to the task, such as his 
determination, fitness and familiarity with the route.  In other words we might be justified 
in thinking, shortly after Cedric has lost his leg, that the closest possible worlds to the 
actual world in which Cedric has both legs and tries to cycle from Singapore to Thailand, 
are worlds in which he makes it to Thailand.  Of course Cedric is physically unable to 
cycle to Thailand after the loss of his leg.  At that time it is false that  
If Cedric were to try to cycle from Singapore to Thailand-with-one-leg then he 
would normally succeed. 
 
So after losing his leg, Cedric does not know how to cycle to Thailand-with-one leg.  But 
neither did Cedric know how to cycle to Thailand-with-one leg before he lost his leg.  So 
Cedric’s cycling know-how has not been changed at all by his sudden disability.  
 None of this means that losing his leg cannot lead Cedric to lose his knowledge of 
how to cycle to Thailand. Suppose that six months convalescence required by the 
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amputation of his leg causes Cedric’s general fitness to deteriorate dramatically.  If we 
know that this is so, we might be justified in judging that he no longer knows how to 
cycle to Thailand.  But that is because we are justified in thinking that if he still had both 
legs but was otherwise just as unfit as he is now, his trying to cycle to Thailand would not 
result in success.  It may be impossible to determine the exact time at which the 
deterioration in Cedric’s general fitness marks the point at which Cedric loses his 
counterfactual ability to cycle to Thailand-with-two-legs.  This is part of the reason why 
ascriptions of know-how are vague. 
We may now explain the egocentricity of know-how.  I might know how to 
scratch my own head because were I to try to scratch it then I would succeed in doing so.  
But since I drunkenly mistake my reflection for a different person, trying to scratch that 
person’s head is not trying to scratch my own head.   Suppose that the only way I can 
think of to scratch that person’s head is to first find the person on the other side of the 
glass and then scratch that person’s head.  Since there is no person on the other side of 
the glass any attempt I were to make to scratch that person’s head would fail.  I do not 
know how to scratch the head of the person I see in the glass. 
 What partly explains the opacity of know-how is the reference to trying.  If Lois 
were to try to contact Clark then she would succeed.  After all she sees Clark every day at 
work so success at this task is easy to come by.  So Lois knows how to contact Clark.  
But although contacting Clark is necessarily contacting Superman, trying to contact Clark 
is not necessarily trying to contact Superman.  Suppose that the only way of contacting 
Superman Lois can think of is to wait at Metropolis airport where he was last sighted, in 
the hope of contacting him.  But Superman does not know that Lois is trying to contact 
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him and has no intention of returning to Metropolis airport.  So if Lois were to try to 
contact Superman she would fail.  She does not know how to contact Superman. 
The case of Donald, who knows how to make equilateral triangles but not 
equiangular ones, proves trickier for the account to handle.  Since Donald would succeed 
in making an equilateral triangle if he tried, he may know how to make one.  But unlike 
Lois, who may sensibly try to contact Superman, Donald cannot even try to make an 
equiangular triangle. Just as believing that cats are vertebrates requires the ability to think 
the thought that cats are vertebrates, so trying to make an equiangular triangle requires 
the ability to think thoughts of an equiangular triangle.  This in turn requires a grasp of 
the concepts embedded in that would-be thought.  But although Donald has the concept 
of equilaterality, he has no concept of equiangularity.  So it is impossible for him to try to 
make an equiangular triangle.   
This seems to pose a problem for the account.  The standard way in which we 
decide whether a counterfactual conditional is true is to ask whether the worlds closest to 
the actual world in which the antecedent is true are worlds in which the consequent is 
true.  We then judge that the conditional is true just in case our answer is affirmative.  But 
this question cannot be sensibly asked in cases in which we know that it is impossible for 
the antecedent to be true.  For then we know that there are no possible worlds in which 
the antecedent is true that are either closest or furthest from the actual world.     
The standard response to this is that conditionals with counterpossible antecedents 
are true.  This seems to raise the difficulty that the account of know-how so far means 
that anyone knows how to anything provided is it impossible for him to try to do it.   
However, the standard response is also that the truth of conditionals with counterpossible 
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antecedents is merely vacuous.  So we might be prepared to admit that it is true that 
anyone knows how to anything provided is it impossible for him to try to do it, but only 
in a vacuous sense.  Against this, a purist might insist that there is no sense, vacuous or 
otherwise, in which Donald knows how to make equiangular triangles.   
One way of satisfying the purist is to say that a second condition of S knowing 
how to V-in-circumstances-C is that it is possible for S to succeed in V-ing in 
circumstances C.  Surely we cannot know how to do things we cannot do.  Nobody 
knows how to disprove Pythagoras’s theorem.  But there is no success without trying.  In 
other words, S cannot succeed in V-ing unless S has tried to V.  This is shown by the fact 
that ‘Fred tried to flatter his wife but only succeeded in irritating her’ only ascribes 
‘success’ in an ironic sense, because Fred was not trying to irritate his wife.  So although 
Donald has made an equiangular triangle he has not succeeded in doing so because he did 
not try to make one.  He only tried to make an equilateral triangle.  Likewise Hannah 
could not succeed in digesting food because she could not try to digest it.  She does not 
know how to digest food any more than Donald knows how to make an equiangular 
triangle. 
But in fact, this addition is redundant.  Counterfactual success is only a necessary, 
not sufficient, condition of know-how.  As I will argue in the next section, in order to 
fully define know-how, we need to add a clause in order to exclude analogues of Gettier 
cases in which someone enjoys accidental counterfactual success.  This clause will also 
exclude cases in which is impossible for someone to try to perform the task at hand. 
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9. Analogues of Gettier cases and reliable methods of success 
 
Besides the case of Shelley, who accidentally succeeds in making a cake, Hawley gives 
two other instructive examples (2003, 26-27) supposedly of someone who enjoys 
counterfactual success in V-ing but who fails to know how to V.  The first is of Sally, 
who 
… has no idea what to do in the event of an avalanche.  When an avalanche occurs, she mistakes 
snow for water, makes swimming motions, and – luckily – escapes the avalanche, since in fact the 
way to escape an avalanche is to make swimming motions.  Sally satisfies the counterfactual 
success condition for escaping avalanches – if she were to try, she would succeed, for she is prone 
to mistaking snow for water. Yet it seems that her success is merely a matter of luck …   
The second example goes as follows 
… consider Susie, who likes to annoy Joe, and believes that she does so by smoking.  In fact Joe is 
annoyed by Susie’s tapping on her cigarette box, which she does whenever she smokes.  Susie 
would succeed in annoying Joe if she tried, but is seems that she does not know how to annoy Joe, 
perhaps because she misconstrues the situation. 
But Hawley’s first example fails to count against the claim that counterfactual success is 
sufficient for know-how.  Unlike Shelley and Susie, Sally did not try to do what she 
ended up doing.  Shelly tried to make a cake and Susie tried to annoy Joe.  But although 
Sally survived an avalanche, she could not have tried to escape one, since she mistook 
snow for water.  Surely if she were trying to escape an avalanche then she would have 
had snow, not water, in mind.  Perhaps she was trying to escape a flood.  Then she would 
have made swimming motions and so would have survived the flood. But then her 
success in surviving a flood is not accidental, so there is no objection to saying that she 
knows how to survive a flood.  Now suppose that, consistently with the terms of the 
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example, Sally believes that the way to survive an avalanche is to curl up into a ball. In 
fact this belief is false, since curling up into a ball is the way to perish from an avalanche.  
Then if Sally were to try to survive an avalanche and so have snow in mind, she would 
not succeed in surviving one.  So she does not know how to survive an avalanche.  In 
neither case do we have counterfactual success without know-how, so the 
counterexample fails. 
 By contrast, the cases of Shelley and Susie do show that counterfactual success is 
insufficient for know-how.  In circumstances in which the closest ingredients to hand just 
happen to be those needed for a cake, Shelley’s method of trying to make a cake would 
result in a cake.  But since it was a stroke of luck that the closest ingredients to hand were 
those needed to make a cake, Shelley’s success was accidental and so does not count as 
know-how.  Given that Susie’s smoking is always accompanied by her tapping, which 
always irritates Joe, and given that smoking is the only way in which she would try to 
irritate Joe, it follows that if she were to try to irritate Joe then she would succeed.  But 
whereas Shelley’s method of making a cake succeeds because she uses it in lucky 
circumstances, Susie’s method of irritating Joe results in success because its practice is 
luckily accompanied by the true cause of success, of which Susie is ignorant.  Since 
Susie’s success was accidental, she does not know how to irritate Joe. 
 Hawley is neutral on the question of what else is needed to define know-how. I 
propose that her two examples require that the knower have a reliable method of 
achieving success.  So the full definition of know-how becomes 
S knows how to V-in-circumstances-C just in case if S were to try to V in C then 
S would succeed because S would use a reliable method of V-ing in C. 
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This blocks the examples. The method that Shelley would use to make a cake, which 
involves taking the closest ingredients to hand, is not a reliable method of making one. A 
reliable method of V-ing is at least a method that results in V-ing more often than not 
when applied over time in a wide variety of circumstances.  By contrast, although 
Shelly’s method would occasionally result in success in lucky circumstances, in most 
circumstances it would not.  The case of Susie is blocked in a different way.  Tapping her 
cigarette box is a reliable method of irritating Joe, but it is not the method that Susie 
would use to irritate him. The method that Susie would use is to smoke.  Contrary to 
Susie’s belief, merely smoking would not irritate him.  So the method of irritating Joe 
that Susie would use is hardly reliable.   
 We may now explain why Donald does not know how to make an equiangular 
triangle, despite knowing how to make an equilateral one. A person uses a method of 
performing a task if that person intends to use that method.  Evidence that this is the 
method that person intends to use is how that person would describe that method.  
Moreover a person can only use a method of V-ing if that person has the ability to 
understand that method.   Shelley would describe her method of baking a cake as taking 
whatever ingredients are closest to hand, mixing them and baking the resulting mixture.  
Susie would describe her method of irritating Joe as smoking.  But although Donald 
could describe the method he uses to make an equilateral triangle, he could not describe 
himself as using a method of making one that is equiangular, because he does not have 
the concept of equiangularity embedded in such a description.  For this reason, Donald 
lacks the ability to understand any method, reliable or otherwise, of making an 
equiangular triangle and so cannot use any such method.  Likewise, if I have no idea what     
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entropy is, I cannot know how to prove that entropy is increasing because I cannot 
understand any method of proving this and so cannot use such method either.  Hannah, 
on the other hand can use no method of digesting food because digesting food is never a 
matter of method.  One cannot ineptly or skilfully digest food.  
 
10. Blocking an objection 
 
It might be objected that the claim that there is no know-how without method is too 
strong for cases in which know-how is spontaneously exercised, perhaps by animals. 
Must the comedian who knows how to make his audience laugh, use a method of making 
them laugh?   Must a sheep dog that knows how to round up sheep, use a method of 
doing so?   
No doubt the comedian need not be aware that he is using a method of making his 
audience laugh.  He may be unable to describe himself as having any such method.  But 
this does not rule out the possibility that he uses a method of which he is unaware.  A 
more reflective judge of comedy may be able to discern methodical regularities in the 
comedian’s timing, delivery and sensitivity to which jokes go down best with his 
audience. Consider a comedian who enjoys success in telling off-colour jokes in a strip 
club and then goes on to repeat the performance whatever his audience. He might enjoy 
success before audiences that happen to be similar, but would not do so in front of 
members of a church outing. Any success he enjoys is accidental.  Surely part of the 
reason why he does not know how to make his audience laugh is that there is no method 
in his choice of material. 
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Obviously the sheepdog is unable to produce any description of methods of 
herding sheep.  Moreover it is unclear whether an intention to use a method is 
conceptually too sophisticated for a sheepdog to have, because it is difficult to specify, 
using the linguistic expressions of our thoughts, exactly what concepts are available 
to it.  But such intentions are sufficient, not necessary for S to use a method.  Moreover 
S’s disposition to describe S as using a method is not the only form of evidence that S 
uses a method.  After all, sheepdogs are always trained in ways to round up sheep.  So the 
method that it uses to round up sheep is the method that it has been trained to use, despite 
the fact that it may be unaware of using any method.   Moreover there is a sense in which 
it has the ability to understand the method it uses, for otherwise it could not have been 
trained in that method.  Part of the reason it has that ability is that it has the concepts 
embedded in the description of the method.  For if it lacked the ability to distinguish 
sheep from chickens then it could not have learned how to round up sheep.  
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Notes 
1. Blackburn (1996) Dummett (1991, Chapter 4), Lewis (1988) and Mellor (1993) 
consider whether knowledge of meaning or morality is knowing how to use 
words, follow rules or behave well. 
 
2. Jackson (1982, 130, 1986, 291) supposes that Mary is a brilliant scientist who has 
spent her life in a black and white room watching black and white television 
images.  Mary comes to know everything there is to know about the physics of 
colour.  But when Mary leaves her room and sees red for the first time, she 
intuitively acquires new knowledge.  Lewis (1983, 131, 1990, p. 516) tries to 
avoid Jackson’s conclusion that Mary has acquired new propositional knowledge 
about the non-physical world by claiming that Mary has come to know how to 
recognise, remember and imagine experiences of red.  
  
3. Hawley (2003) does not seem to consider this move. 
 
4. Opacity must involve substitutions of logical equivalence.  So Davidson’s (1963) 
early example, in which someone knows how to flip the switch but not how to 
alert the prowler, although interesting, does not count as the opacity of know-how 
since it only involves substitution of contingent effect for actual cause.     
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